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During its development into a continental empire, the US, like other countries relied on 
the investment of capital and labour from abroad; unlike other countries, the US had a 
peculiar political institution, federalism, which channeled these resources and also 
determined the course of protest against these resources. The paper argues that 
federalism played a key role in determining the course of US economic development 
and reaction to this early instance of globalization, a role with possible lessons for other 
countries today. 
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   1
Despite disputes over the inputs to globalization in the long nineteenth century, the 
major outcome has been generally agreed since at least the publication of Sellar and 
Yeatman’s pithy assessment of the world at 1918: ‘America was thus clearly top nation, 
and History came to a .’1 Later scholarly refinements in this view stress the United 
States of America’s position as principal beneficiary of the free movement of both 
labour and capital in the ‘first great globalization boom’, but the essential point remains 
the same: the US received the lion’s share of internationally mobile capital and labour2 
and the Americans made such profitable use of these additions to their already 
prodigious factor endowment that they transformed their nation within a scant few 
decades from the world’s great debtor to its great creditor, and thus stood ready, at least 
in respect of their economic capacity, to assume the role of ‘top nation’, as recently 
vacated by Great Britain. We might therefore quite reasonably suppose that as an 
obvious outlier in the pool of developing nations the US might not provide usable 
lessons in the role of institutions on the course of development. But this is true only if 
we consider national economies as impervious black boxes – if we think, in short, in 
Sellar-and-Yeatmanesque terms of top nations. If we consider that regions within the 
US developed with marked unevenness, we should learn a set of lessons from the 
American pattern of development that might have a broader modern application.3 The 
dispositive governmental institution in determining the unevenness of American 
development was federalism, by which we mean the relative autonomy of geographic 
regions within the nation, which were also represented, as regions, in the national 
legislature. This institution not only abetted the disparity of development among the 
Northern, Southern, and Western sections of the US, but also ensured that the emergent 
‘top nation’ in 1918 had a state possessing few central powers, but considerable 
economic regulations nevertheless. The distinguishing characteristic of American 
federalism, as we shall consider it here, is its tendency to give representation and a 
measure of self-government (including the ability to borrow, develop infrastructure, and 
set social policy) to regions for essentially arbitrary reasons, irrespective either of their 
population or of their cultural integrity. 
Scholars generally regard federalism as one of three central defining features of 
American constitutionalism, the others being presidentialism and judicialism. All three 
institutions provide that some parts of the political structure enjoy a significant degree 
of independence from the national legislature – presidentialism entails a strong 
executive independent of the legislature and judicialism a strong judiciary independent 
of the legislature; federalism entails strong semi-sovereign local entities, principally the 
states, largely independent of the national legislature. Federalism has traditionally 
attracted a great deal of international interest, at least since Tocqueville, for its ability to 
defuse political differences within a large polity. In turn American federalists had 
borrowed extensively from David Hume, and the political functions of federal union 
have a long transatlantic history. But federalism played an important and 
                                                 
1   Which is to say, ‘full stop.’ W. C. Sellar and R. J. Yeatman, 1066 and All That (1931; reprint, New 
York: Barnes & Noble, 1993), p. 115. 
2   Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution of a 
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underappreciated role in allowing Americans to adapt to the specific conditions of 
nineteenth-century globalization.4 
Federalism had three principal consequences in the course of American development. 
i)  Local autonomy meant that different regions established institutions conducive 
to economic development at different rates; it also meant that the nation 
developed such institutions more swiftly than it would have under a national 
regime. 
ii)  Local autonomy under a national umbrella encouraged the establishment of the 
characteristically American layer of private investment-bank intermediaries 
that helped direct overseas investment in the developing US economy. 
iii)  Local autonomy combined with the foregoing factors channeled regional 
politics of protest against industrialization into the arena of national politics, 
shaping the modern American state. 
If we wish to draw conclusions for the present day from this history, we should 
carefully consider the role played by federalism both in determining US success at 
attracting investment in the nineteenth-century era of globalization and also in 
distributing the benefits of that investment within the United States. 
First we should consider the role of institutions in the phenomenon of American 
divergence. Kenneth L. Sokoloff and Stanley L. Engerman frame the debate over the 
role of institutions in development by noting that the divergence between the North 
American nations of the US and Canada and the rest of the Western hemisphere does 
not appear until the era of industrialization, in the early 1800s.5 Prior to that the 
Caribbean islands were richer. Thus the literature on differential development within the 
New World normally emphasizes variation in habits and institutions associated with 
growth of industry – ‘security of property rights, prevalence of corruption, structures of 
the financial sector, investment in public infrastructure and social capital, and the 
inclination to work hard or be entrepreneurial’.6 But as Sokoloff and Engerman also 
remark it is difficult in turn to identify the encouraging factors in the establishment of 
such institutions. National heritage – thst is, the legacy of colonization by Britain as 
opposed to colonization by Spain – does not explain much of the international 
divergence in development. And initial factor endowments look similar across New 
World nations, all of which had relatively high availability of land and other natural 
resources and low supplies of labour. What differed was inequality, which was higher in 
                                                 
4   On elements of American constitutionalism and their influence abroad, see George Athan Billias (ed.), 
American Constitutionalism Abroad: Selected Essays in Comparative Constiutional History (New 
York: Greenwood, 1990); Albert P. Blaustein, The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad 
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and Paths of Development in the New World’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 3 (2000): 217-
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the richer Southerly countries, which subsequently established institutions that 
encouraged the persistence of inequality and inhibited growth. The US and Canada did 
otherwise, instead promoting the rapid settlement of their profitable interiors, extending 
the suffrage, and promoting education. Sokoloff and Engerman hypothesize these 
institutions reinforced early patterns of lower inequality in the North American nations 
and encouraged sustained early economic growth through investment in increasing the 
productive capacity of larger numbers of people.7 
To this point we are on relatively familiar ground. Even if we abandon the old theories 
of cultural heritage, which amount to little more than racial inheritance by another 
name, we face the same point – an institutional mix favouring economic development 
(Sokoloff and Engerman say, because it did not favour inequality) prevailed in the 
United States. We often find ourselves stuck at this point because we insist on thinking 
in terms of national economies – of the United States as a whole – rather than of 
constituent components. Yet we know full well both that economic development 
occurred unevenly within the United States and also that the institutions favouring it 
developed unevenly as well. This uneven development created pockets of economic 
backwardness within an otherwise forward country. But it also shaped the overall 
national process of development. 
1  Regional representation and institutions favouring economic development 
If it is true that the US established institutions, like widespread education, that promoted 
development of their interiors, it is also true that these institutions did not appear 
throughout the country but were concentrated in particular regions. Research on the 
determinants of international variation in developing these institutions indicates that 
regional representation and local autonomy played a key role not only allowing the 
creation of backward pockets within the United States but also in pushing the US to the 
forefront of nations encouraging economic development. Peter H. Lindert finds that the 
forward position of the US in developing primary schooling owed principally to the 
nation’s decentralized character, which allowed the pro-schooling North to move ahead 
with establishing an extensive educational system in the early nineteenth century while 
the South, less enthusiastic about learning, remained behind.8 Lindert shows that the 
decentralization of representation allowed the whole country to move ahead faster than 
it would have with a more central, national government that would have required a 
national majority to set pro-schooling policy. And it allowed the South to remain 
backward. Despite a momentary shift in Southern opinion in the era of Reconstruction 
that followed the Civil War – when Southern states had some degree of black voting 
and a viable Republican Party – the subsequent era of segregation in the 1880s and 
1890s saw Southern retrenchment and a reaffirmation of its determination to underfund 
schools.9 
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Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 104-127. 
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Table 1 Lindert’s model showing how regional outonomy encourages the establishment of 
schools* 
  Share of voters in favour of taxes and 
public schools 
Whose children get public 
schools? 




Backward era  30%  10%  20%  none  none 
Early rise  55  25  40  North only  none 
Middle era  70  40  55  North only  all 
Advanced era  85  55  70  all  all 
* The hypothesis is two regions, North and South, with differential desires for better schooling that advance 
as economic development in the region advances. From Lindert (2004: table 5.4). 
 
The nineteenth century thus established the pattern of a Northern US willing to invest in 
institutions like widespread public education that encouraged economic development 
while the Southern US resisted this use of public funds. The same pattern applied to 
investment in infrastructure: Northern politicians tended to favour spending public 
monies on roads, canals, and railways while Southern politicians did not. This regional 
disparity had an expected outcome both in the proliferation of such transport links in the 
North and, if Lindert’s model of education funding applies here too, which seems 
reasonable, in the country overall to a greater degree than would have been the case had 
Americans relied solely on their national government to fund such improvements. It had 
an unexpected outcome in contributing to the growth of another institution critical to the 
pattern of American development. 
As Joel Silbey notes, the strong partisan division within the US over the use of federal 
money for internal improvements in infrastructure complemented and cut across a 
sectional division over the same issue. Democrats, also known as Jacksonians, strongly 
opposed the use of federal dollars to pay for such improvements, leaving their 
opponents, the Whig party, to favour it. But even within the Whig party, Southerners 
remained ambivalent about the use of national power to promote such expansion. The 
Whigs, the national party nominally favouring central funding of infrastructure 
development, thus failed to present a unified front on this issue. The funding of 
infrastructure fell to local authorities including, principally, state governments who sold 
bonds to pay for them.10 
This considerable borrowing, followed by the economic downturns of the late 1830s 
and early 1840s, led eight states and the territory of Florida to default on their debts, 
much of which had found its way into the hands of British investors. At the time the 
British writer Sydney Smith, who had invested in the bonds of Pennsylvania, railed 
against the Americans for refusing to raise their taxes sufficiently to honor their 
obligations, condemning them as ‘a nation with whom no contract can be made, because 
none will be kept; unstable in the very foundations of social life, deficient in the 
elements of good faith, men who prefer any load of infamy however great, to any 
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pressure of taxation, however light’.11 John J. Wallis, Richard Sylla, and Arthur Grinath 
III find that at least in the case of Pennsylvania Smith was correct; the state should have 
been able to avoid default if it had ‘imposed a realistic property tax’.12 
The case of Mississippi – the defaulter that stayed in default – presented a different 
picture, inasmuch as bigotry, which would keep the South underdeveloped for 
generations, played some role in its default and also because the reasons for its default 
differed. Wallis et al. point out that Mississippi borrowed heavily to establish a state 
bank for development purposes. When this bank failed, Mississippi chose to default. 
The Magnolia State might have devoted its tax revenues, which were sufficient to the 
purpose, to covering its debts but chose instead to repudiate. Its Governor, Alexander 
McNutt, explained that this was in part because the debt would only enrich one of the 
Rothschilds: 
[Rothschild] has advanced money to the Sublime Porte [i.e. the Ottoman 
Empire, and Islamic kingdom; this was not true], and taken as security a 
mortgage upon the Holy City of Jerusalem, and the Sepulchre of our 
Saviour. [This was not true either, though it helped inflame anti-Semitic 
prejudice.] It is for the people to say whether he shall have a mortgage on 
our cotton fields, and make serfs of our children. Let the Baron 
[Rothschild] exact his pound of flesh of ... the Bank of the United 
States…13 
Such generalized anti-foreign sentiment, coupled with other forms of racism or religious 
bigotry, helped keep the South isolated from internationally mobile capital and also 
from internationally mobile labour. Despite the hopes of New South boosters that 
immigration might reinvigorate the Southern economy after the end of slavery, few 
immigrants went to the South and those that did go soon left, unimpressed by the returns 
to plantation labourers and little interesting in being ‘treated just as the black race used 
to be’.14 
To this point we have seen that the institution of federalism, so central to the United 
States constitution, allowed Northerners to indulge their preferences for schooling and 
thus to lift the educational level of the nation as a whole, and also to allow the South to 
exercise its preference for slavery, plantation agriculture, and their cultural 
consequences over economic modernization. These developments both kept the United 
States per se an attractive investment and ensured that global investment – whether of 
                                                 
11  Sydney Smith, Letters on American Debts (London: Longman, Brown, Green & Longmans, 1843), 
p. 9. 
12  John Joseph Wallis, Richard E. Sylla, and Arthur Grinath, III, ‘Sovereign Debt and Repudiation: The 
Emerging-Market Debt Crisis in the US States, 1839-1843’, (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
2004), NBER Working Paper 10753, 1-50, p. 23. 
13  ‘Veto Message of Governor M'nutt, of Mississippi’, U.S. Commercial and Statistical Register, 5 May 
1841, p. 276. The Rothschilds did not establish a lending relationship with Turkey until 1854; the 
rumour that they had or wished to acquire Jerusalem was an anti-Semitic myth of long standing in the 
US press. See Niall Ferguson, The World’s Banker: The History of the House of Rothschild (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), pp. 584, 419-20. 
14    Rowland T. Berthoff, ‘Southern Attitudes toward Immigration, 1865-1914’, Journal of Southern 
History 17, 3 (1951): 328-60, p. 331.   6
capital or labour – went chiefly into the Northeast of the country and into those regions 
most tightly tied to it – the industrial Great Lakes region and, as rail lines extended 
under the pressure of investment capital, the further West.15 The Northeast and the 
West became more developed sooner than the South, comprising a single, increasingly 
integrated market from which the South remained measurably excluded. And the 
institution of regional representation also encouraged the rise of another peculiarly 
American institution, the strong intermediary investment market of trans-atlantic banks. 
2  Regional representation and private financial intermediaries 
Within the world of nineteenth-century capital investment, the United States stands out 
as a peculiar case. This is not only because it received the largest single share of capital 
invested in developing countries – that is a question of quantity, and not necessarily an 
interestingly large quantity; relative to the size of its economy and to the capacity of 
American savers to invest, foreign investment in the United States did not amount to so 
very much. But in terms of the distribution of investment, foreign investment in the 
United States differed from foreign investment in other large borrowers. Particularly, 
while foreign investment in other developing countries went often into government 
securities, in the United States government borrowing accounted for a small share of 
foreign investment, the largest chunk of which went into private railway securities. 
 
Capital called on British market by economic sector, 1865-1914 (%) 
   US  Canada  Argentina  Australia  India 
Government 6 34 22  66  46 
Railways 62  40  58  1 40 
Public utilities  9  6  9  4  3 
Financial 6  6  5 12  2 
Raw materials  5  4  0  13  6 
Industrial   11  10  5  4  2 
Shipping 1  0  1  1  1 
Total private  94  66  78  34  54 
Total (%)*  100  100  100  100  100 
* Numbers rounded and so may not add exactly to 100. 
 
                                                 
15  On the isolation of the Southern market see Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the 
Southern Economy since the Civil War (New York: Basic, 1986). More recently, Joshua L. 
Rosenbloom, ‘One Market or Many? Labour Market Integration in the Late Nineteenth-Century 
United States’, Journal of Economic History 50, 1 (1990): 85-107. Also, generally, Gavin Wright, 
‘The Strange Career of the New Southern Economic History’, Reviews in American History 10, 4 
(1982): 164-80.   7
Consider Table 2, derived from Irving Stone’s figures.16 Among the major recipients of 
British capital investment from 1865 to 1914, the United States stands out as having 
borrowed much less on public account – 6 per cent of the total sum of capital called, as 
opposed to between a fifth and two-thirds for others. 
As the work of Mira Wilkins and of Lance Davis and Robert Gallman indicates, the 
reasons for this have to do at least in part with the American states’ defaults, not only in 
the 1840s but again in the 1870s. As Davis and Gallman write,  
[g]overnments with good reputations, Australia and Canada for example, 
did not have to draw on the services of international financial syndicates 
to underwrite and market their bonds. In the case of the United States 
such syndicates were required. Although costly, they generated collateral 
economic benefits in terms of the evolution of the domestic financial 
structure. The American syndicates included not only well-established 
British and continental merchant banks, but also young US investment 
banks; and syndicate membership improved the reputations of those 
American bankers both at home and abroad.... The better the reputation 
of the government issues, the less need there was for specific private 
institutions designed to link foreign savers to domestic investors, 
institutions that could, at a later date, be modified to channel domestic 
savings into domestic investment.17 
In countries like Argentina, with less capital of their own, where British investors could 
place their money directly, the import of poor reputation was less perverse than in the 
United States. But the US had not only a history of bad credit, but also a peculiar 
political structure within which to distribute responsibility for it. 
In the wake of the defaults of the 1840s, ‘United States’ security’ became a by-word for 
worthless paper in the world, as Charles Dickens had Ebenezer Scrooge exclaim in A 
Christmas Carol.18 Sydney Smith claimed that the United States ‘cannot draw the 
sword because they have not money to buy it’, and so could not support ‘a long, tedious 
... war of four or five years duration’.19 Smith proved wrong. Within a couple of 
decades, the United States was able to finance its Civil War, which was by any standard 
a major war of four years’ duration. The US succeeded in this partly because banker Jay 
Cooke recruited thousands of salesmen to sell government debt.20 Cooke wanted to 
finance the war without going to the global markets – ‘[w]e ... had better not put a whip 
into the hands of foreigners to punish us’, he wrote. He succeeded, and his success on 
                                                 
16  Irving Stone, The Global Export of Capital from Great Britain, 1865-1914: A Statistical Survey (New 
York: St. Martins, 1999). 
17  Lance Edwin Davis and Robert E. Gallman, Evolving Financial Markets and International Capital 
Flows: Britain, the Americas, and Australia, 1870-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p. 763; Mira T. Wilkins, The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 111. 
18  Charles Dickens, Christmas Stories, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: T. B. Peterson, 1857), vol. 1, p. 47. 
19  Smith, Letters on American Debts, (1843) pp. 9, 14, 20. 
20    Vincent P. Carosso, Investment Banking in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1970), pp. 15-17.   8
the market and the US Army’s success in the field re-established America’s viability as 
an investment proposition and also established the role of private investment banks as 
central to that viability.  
The panic of 1873 cemented the lesson that American states could not be relied upon. 
Ironically, Cooke’s firm touched off the panic when the failure of the Northern Pacific 
railroad caused its own failure. Afterward eleven states, ten of them in the South, 
defaulted on debt amounting to perhaps $130 million (converted to today’s dollars, as a 
relative share of US GDP, this would amount to about $159 thousand million).21 In 
consequence, as Wilkins notes, the 1870s and 1880s saw relatively little foreign capital 
go into US government bonds.22 Instead it went through private intermediaries, such as 
investment banks with offices on both sides of the Atlantic: J. S. Morgan & Co. and 
Drexel Morgan; Brown Shipley and Brown Brothers; Seligman Brothers and J. W. 
Seligman, and so forth. 
As Davis and Gallman establish in their comparative study of developing nations, this 
history of public defaults and the rise of a private substitute for the unreliable public 
financial intermediary made the United States unusual among frontier nations of the late 
nineteenth century. Argentina, Australia, and Canada all used public debt to fund the 
development of their rich interiors. Even though Australia and Canada enjoyed political 
independence from Britain, the British saver tended to view their securities as backed by 
the British Treasury, and ultimately the law backed this view. US securities not only 
were not so soundly supported but bespoke a worryingly careless history, and so 
American government issues paid 1.8 per cent more than Canadian ones on average and 
2.3 per cent more than Australian issues. Argentina did not enjoy such a favourable 
position, but lacking so much capital of its own quickly yielded its publicly owned 
railroads to direct private British control. Only the United States saw the development 
of significant private intermediaries, in the form of the transatlantic investment banks, to 
channel foreign investment.23 
On this interpretation what makes the US experience distinctive is not, or not only, the 
canny behaviour of the early Federalists, but the careless behaviour of the subsequent 
Jacksonians, and the dispersal of financial responsibility among the various American 
states.24 Despite the success of the 1790 reorganization of US debt under Alexander 
Hamilton and the subsequent good behaviour of the US federal government as debtor, 
the ability of Americans to borrow through their government suffered from the bad 
behaviour of the individual American states, whose defaults in the 1840s and 1870s 
damaged not only their ability to borrow, but that of the US government as well. US 
government debt remained relatively small, and domestic savers tended to buy it up for 
their own portfolios. The financing of major projects like the construction of Western 
                                                 
21  Cleona Lewis and Karl T. Schlotterbeck, America’s Stake in International Investments (Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1938), p. 59. 
22  Wilkins, History of Foreign Investment to 1914 (1989), p. 111. 
23  Davis and Gallman, Evolving Financial Markets (2001), pp. 759-63. 
24  Cf. Michael D. Bordo and Carlos A. Vegh, ‘What If Alexander Hamilton Had Been Argentinean? A 
Comparison of the Early Monetary Experiences of Argentina and the United States’, (National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 1998), NBER Working Paper 6862, pp. 1-56. The argument presented here 
draws on Eric Rauchway, Blessed among Nations (New York: Hill & Wang, 2006).   9
railroads therefore encouraged the establishment of a relatively responsible private 
investment market devoted in part to channeling foreign capital into the United States. 
To the extent that the United States’ national government did finance and direct internal 
development it did so fitfully and with an eye often to partisan advantage rather than 
any particular economic theory. The first transcontinental railroad was indeed financed 
from public wealth, mainly by land-grants. Analysts have wrangled, at least since this 
effort imploded in scandal in the early 1870s, whether the decision to use public wealth 
to finance the railroad was wise. Few have disagreed that the distribution of resources 
benefited a few key figures with close ties to Republican politicians. Later historians 
have noted, though without quite reaching complete consensus, that the public subsidy 
of the railroads did not achieve significant developmental advantages. As Jeremy Atack 
and Peter Passell summarize the debate, 
Federal land grant subsidies, then, were a proposition of dubious value. 
They were unnecessary incentives for some of the railroads since claims 
of market failure were unfounded. They were an unnecessarily expensive 
incentive for others because the actual form of mitigating market failure 
was inefficient. They only possible saving grave of federal land grant 
subsidies was their value as a deterrent to inefficient monopoly pricing 
by the carriers. But the pratical impact of that deterrent has yet to be 
demonstrated empirically.25 
And while it is true that beyond the railroad grants, the Republican Party established a 
national policy for economic development in the 1860s that had some important effects, 
it is also true that the party quickly departed from that policy when its political costs 
became too heavy. The railway subsidies went along with a protective tariff, an act to 
distribute homesteads, an act to encourage immigration, and the Morrill Land Grant 
Act, which created public institutions of higher education in American states, with the 
idea of promoting the development of scientific agriculture and mining. The 
encouragement and subsidy of immigration proved both unpopular and unnecessary. 
The tariff quickly lost whatever theoretical integrity it had in the chaos of intra-regional 
bargaining, and by the 1890s it had become an elabourate compromise brokered 
between Western and Eastern elements of the Republican coalition, tied intimately to 
the purchase of voter loyalty through the pension system. The Morrill Land Grant 
institutions, perhaps alone among the elements of the Republicans’ national plan of the 
1860s, lasted and made important and measurable contributions to American economic 
development. But the Republican Party had by the early 1870s backed off the 
commitment to a national developmental policy and did not, because it could not 
politically afford to, return to it.26 
                                                 
25  Jeremy Atack and Peter Passell, A New Economic View of American History, 2nd edn. (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1994), pp. 443-4. 
26 On the national plan of the 1860s, Heather Cox Richardson, The Greatest Nation of the Earth: 
Republican Economic Policies During the Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1997). On the demise of that plan, Heather Cox Richardson, The Death of Reconstruction: Race, 
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Press, 2001). On the tariff as part of a bargaining chip in the Republicans’ sectional coalition, Richard 
Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900 (Cambridge: 
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We can then say that the institution of regional representation and the American federal 
structure entailed at least two major consequences for the pattern of US development in 
the nineteenth-century era of globalization. First, regional representation allowed the 
expression, protection, and implementation of local preferences for the establishment of 
institutions conducive to economic development. This meant not only that certain 
sections of the US became more developed earlier than others, but also that the whole 
nation became more developed than it otherwise would. Thus the US became an 
attractive investment for overseas capital, but some parts of it became more attractive 
than others. Second, regional representation allowed the expression, protection, and 
implementation of local preferences for financial responsibility. This meant not only 
that certain sections of the US were better able to borrow than others, but also that 
Americans had to develop a national institution devoted to serving the role of 
information aggregator and arbiter, a role otherwise and elsewhere served by 
governments. Thus the US remained an attractive investment for overseas capital, but 
that capital tended to come through private investment banks rather than through public 
coffers. Taking these developments together we can move to a consideration of the 
third, and perhaps most important, consequence of federalism for the US as a 
developing nation. 
3  Regional representation and the reaction to globalization 
As we have seen so far one of the major effects of federalism was to allow the US South 
to effectively exempt itself from the process of globalization, opting out of the 
international movement of capital and labour. Southern states resisted investment in 
institutions that increased the value of their workforce, resisted immigration, and 
accounted for the majority of defaults. This led to the isolation of the South 
economically, and contributed to its historic sense of alienation from nationalizing 
projects of all kinds. 
Another major effect of federalism in the era of nineteenth-century globalization was to 
allow the influential political expression of regional dissatisfaction with the movement 
of foreign capital and labour into and through the country. More concretely, the 
importance of regional representation in the US constitution meant that the relatively 
underpopulated Western part of the country, especially when allied with the perennially 
discontented South, could determine national policy with respect to the movement of 
global capital and labour.27 And although the term ‘globalization’ belongs to our era, 
we can surely recognize that a nineteenth-century protest against the impact of foreign 
capital and the impact of foreign labour has a great deal in common with the protests 
against globalization in our own time. 
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The principal effect of foreign investment in the United States, going as it did first into 
railways and secondarily into mining and other frontier activities, was to speed the 
development and to a degree the settlement of the West. Between the US Civil War and 
the Great War, twelve new states entered the American union, carved out of the nation’s 
rich interior and following a path roughly consonant with that of the new railroads. 
Even though these states often had notably few people living in them, owing to the 
unalterable provisions of the US Constitution they enjoyed the usual representation in 
the United States Senate.28 The new states thus contributed one-quarter of the nation’s 
Senators by 1913. 
An economically colonial connection bound the new states to the Northeastern portion 
of the country, such that Westerners and subsequent historians alike identified the 
relationship between the sections as imperial. The process of developing the American 
West, much like the process of colonizing Africa or Southeast Asia, was undertaken by 
‘an expanding metropolitan economy creating ever more elabourate and intimate 
linkages’ to a hinterland rich in animal, mineral, or vegetable resources and inhabited by 
people unable to fight off the armies of the metropolis.29 The people of the West nursed 
resentment at their ‘essentially ‘colonial’ relationship’ to the capital-rich East.30  
Westerners inclined to protest this relationship were well aware – economic historians 
often suggest they were overly aware – of the peculiar sources of their discontent.31 
They clearly identified private investment houses, such as J.P. Morgan & Co., as 
playing a semi-sovereign role in American economic development, a role that in other 
countries was played by government, and complained about the authority thus given to 
unelected men responsive only to their clientele and to no political constituency.32 They 
objected to immigration, which powerfully affected the wages of less-skilled workers 
and which, Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson confirm, pushed native-born 
workers out of their home cities and into the West.33 They blamed foreign investors for 
laws protecting high interest rates and monopoly prices: ‘Englishmen now own a 
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majority of the stock of our railroads [not true of the industry overall though true of 
some major lines]... [O]ur fields and factories are being stripped to pay interest to the 
money lenders of England... In Egypt and India she has placed her soldiers to protect 
her bondholders... The money lenders of America, who are advocating our present 
financial laws, are the soldiers of England on the soil of the United States’.34 
As Wallis et al. suggest, we might thus view the United States as ‘less a nation or 
country in the usual sense, and more akin to an empire of different geographic and 
economic regions at different stages of development. Like the British Empire of that 
era, the United States had its commercial-industrial center (similar to Great Britain) in 
the northeast, its semi-tropical cash-crop exporting area (its India) in the South, and its 
temperate region of recent settlement (its Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) in the 
old northwest’.35 Unlike the British empire, the United States gave its colonial regions 
full representation in its metropolitan parliament. India had no MPs at Westminster, but 
Wyoming had two Senators and a Congressman at Washington. 
In consequence, protest against the colonial relationship found an outlet in the national 
politics of the United States. During the period from the 1880s through the First World 
War, when other rich industrial countries were busily establishing welfare-state policies, 
the national politics of the United States focused instead, almost entirely to the 
exclusion of social spending, on the problems of regulating commerce and banking 
within the internal empire of continental America. And although support for such 
measures was not confined to peripheral regions, it was characteristic of the American 
federal institution that, as Elizabeth Sanders argues, in the US Congress the farmers of 
the South and West together ‘had the incentive and provided the muscle’ to create such 
a regulatory state.36 
By the time the United States entered the First World War, its politics of sectional 
protest, funneled through its institutions of regional representation, provided it with a 
regime of economic regulation. Its Interstate Commerce Commission, established in 
1887 and strengthened by subsequent legislation, regulated railway and other shipping 
within the continental empire. Its Federal Trade Commission, established in 1914, 
investigated, weighed, and judged accusations of unfair trade practices. Its Employee’s 
Compensation and Eight-hour Commissions, established in 1916, enforced labour law. 
Its Bureaus of Immigration and Naturalization, established in 1891 and 1906, enforced 
increasingly restrictive immigration legislation that, as of 1917, included a literacy test 
in the migrant’s native language. All these measures enjoyed their strongest support 
from the regions within the United States that were peripheral to its economy – which is 
to say, from the South and the West. 
The adoption of such a regulatory regime increased the power of the national 
government in the United States, and so at first glance it may appear paradoxical that 
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the South, which had only recently fought a Civil War over its asserted right to keep the 
federal government out of its affairs, should have supported such an agenda. But as 
Sanders points out, the South and West supported a particular kind of increase in state 
power: ‘guarantees, benefits, or prohibitions [that] might require judicial suits and, 
ultimately, the exercise of federal police power’, but ‘little, if any, bureaucratic 
discretion’. The eight-hour day or the bar on monopolies had, Sanders writes, ‘an 
automatic, relatively self-enforcing quality’ and so Southerners or other libertarians 
might back them in the comfortable hope they would not lead to a significant increase in 
the arbitrary power or permanent bureaucratic structures of the state.37 Even the most 
bluntly redistributive policies supported by this coalition – the taxes on income, 
inheritance, and excess profits – partook of this generally rule-based, ostensibly self-
enforcing character.38 
Indeed even in policy areas that would normally favour centralization and expertise as a 
matter of course, the politics of reaction against globalization funneled through the 
institutions of regional representation created decentralized, purportedly rule-based 
systems. The major example of such an institution is the US Federal Reserve, created in 
1913. After early experiments of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the 
United States abandoned its central banks and did not seriously begin to consider 
establishing one again until after the panic of 1907. The US thus adopted central 
banking late and indeed at an awkward time both for itself and for the world; the first 
Federal Reserve Board took office in the week after the First World War began. And 
even so its makers did not intend the Federal Reserve System to operate as a central 
bank – after all it was not central, but with its twelve districts explicitly and obviously 
decentralized; nor was it a bank, but a banking system supervised by a politically 
appointed board.39 Whatever it was, there is general agreement that it was ill-suited in 
its infancy to guide the US through the challenges of the World War and the crises that 
followed.40 But perhaps this failure is a matter of timing rather than of the Federal 
Reserve System’s intrinsic nature; had not the mantle of ‘top nation’ fallen on American 
shoulders so soon after the Fed’s creation, it might not have made such a mess of its 
work – or it might not have mattered much to the rest of the world. Following the logic 
of historians of the US West and South who see the US as a federated empire, we might 
consider it a rather well-integrated and -regulated empire, successful at managing the 
openness of internal and external markets, because its central legislature allowed 
representation of its colonized regions, and thus of economic interests within the 
empire, irrespective of their population or their colonial status. 
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4 Lessons  for  today 
In 1948 the political scientist and historian Charles Austin Beard argued that ‘with the 
world just emerging from one global war and trembling on the verge of another, 
federalism is now offered as the best pledge that mankind, tormented by wars for 
countless generations, may at last establish tranquillity throughout the earth’.41 As 
borrowed from Hume and refined by James Madison, the institution of federalism 
offered a solution to the creation of a large and indefinitely extensive republic: divide it 
into constituent and semi-autonomous parts.42 In the late 1940s, the institution of 
federalism appeared to offer a mechanism whereby nation-states could shed a little of 
their Westphalian autonomy in exchange for a seat on a managing council – perhaps the 
United Nations – and thus defuse interstate conflict.  
As we have seen there is some reason to argue that the institution of federalism also 
helped the United States adapt to the influence of overseas capital and labour coming 
into the country. Federalism encouraged the regional establishment of widespread 
public education and other institutions, including flexible labour markets, that 
underwrote economic growth. It allowed those regions who wished to go ahead with the 
establishment of such institutions do so without waiting to secure the assent of those 
who did not – particularly, the US South. The ability of the South to opt out of such 
processes while the rest of the country went ahead also contributed, albeit by indirect 
methods, to the establishment of the generally successful private investment 
intermediaries that distinguished foreign investment in the US from that in otherwise 
comparable developing countries of the era. The default of states kept the public 
borrowing and the government of the United States relatively small, and ensured that its 
private banking sector played a semi-sovereign role in its economic development. 
Finally, federalism defused the backlash of America’s internal colonies – the South and 
the West – channeling it into regulatory policies. Because these regions enjoyed 
representation at Washington disproportionate to their population, they played an 
outsized role in shaping the regulatory state the US created for itself in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Yet, with a few exceptions, the American variety of federalism does not much appeal to 
other countries in writing their constitutions. The exceptions – Belgium, Germany, and 
Switzerland – comprised a set of long-established, culturally distinct and semi-
autonomous principalities for whom the appeal of federation was obvious.43 Otherwise 
federalism, if adopted at all, usually subsumed itself to a parliamentary supremacy. And 
indeed in such cases it sometimes failed (as in Yugoslavia) or led to limping and never 
completely comfortable success (as in Canada).44 The problems in such cases appear to 
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be that, as James C. MacPherson writes, in these cases ‘ethnic configurations did not 
follow clear territorial boundaries’.45 
But this is not quite what we have found in our examination of the role American 
federalism played in the US response to globalization. Rather, the story we know seems 
to suggest, however perversely, that the arbitrary drawing of regional lines irrespective 
of population or ethnicity can as succeed as well, provided the lines correspond to more 
or less clear catchments of economic interest. The key to Wyoming’s role in the 
development of the American state lay not in the mystical tie of Wyomingers to their 
land, nor to their ethnic homogeneity, but to their shared experience of annoyance at 
railroads, to their common interest in the prosperity of commodity producers, and to 
their absolute entitlement, however apparently ungrounded in any serious theory of 
representation, to two Senators and a minimum of one Congressman at Washington.46 
It also appears that semi-sovereign localities may be allowed to fail in their fiscal 
responsibility, that democracy may be allowed to exert its peculiar prejudices, provided 
that some umbrella protections, if not inducements, remain for private-sector institutions 
to take their place. The defaults of American states contributed to what appears in the 
long run to have been a relatively successful emergence of private investment 
institutions to serve the role that governments would not. This would not have been 
possible had not national law generally protected the interests of such interstate 
businesses, but in the US it did.47 
We cannot allow either these qualified comments about the unintended successes of US 
federalism or the more exuberant comments of scholars like Beard to blind us to the 
bleaker failures of the system that permitted relative regional autonomy. One of its great 
successes, as we have seen, was its ability to let some sections of the country forge 
ahead while others remained behind. The concrete consequence of this regional 
flexibility was that while the Northern states abandoned slavery in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century, the Southern states kept and strengthened it. And so under 
the system of federalism the Civil War came. Moreover, even afterward, the South 
retained institutions that deprived the freedmen of their civil rights and also kept the 
region economically backward for generations.48 Only the benevolent internal 
colonialism of the New Deal, followed by the more forcible internal colonialism of the 
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Warren Court era, came anywhere near to ending this Southern backwardness.49 This is 
not even to mention the military campaigns against and resettlement of aboriginal 
populations that attended the establishment of states in the US West, a process that, 
were it to occur today, a majority in the world would certainly identify as an unlawful 
ethnic cleansing or genocide.50 
The general lessons we see are three. First, the institution of regional representation, 
which is to say a system preserving some local autonomy under a covering umbrella 
government, appears to have allowed the US successfully to adapt to the influence of 
globalization. Second, this institution did not protect minority rights in its semi-
autonomous regions. Third, its failures often required a more vigorous form of colonial 
intervention, as occurred in the era of the 1860s and again in the 1960s. 
Although more specific lessons require detailed examination of cases we can hazard 
here some speculation informed by the foregoing analysis. Beard and other proselytizers 
for the US Constitution have at one time or another expected a world federation and 
perhaps such may someday come. But at present it seems unlikely. Even the 
development of Europe into a proper confederation seems a long way off. And in any 
case, a world federation or a European federation would not really match the conditions 
in which federalism appears to have served the US comparatively well. Rather, the 
place to try implementation of the model might be within developing countries or 
developing regions. It is possible to imagine a confederation of Asian, Latin American, 
or African nations whose federal government enjoyed regulatory authority over the 
movement of capital and labour while its constituent polities retained jurisdiction over 
schooling and infrastructural improvements. It is even possible to imagine existing 
regional trade federations evolving in this direction. It is also possible to imagine a 
newly established, or re-established, developing country adopting a federal structure 
specifically to encourage the flexibility that the late nineteenth-century US showed. But 
here the problem lies with the circumstances of newly established nations. Their leaders 
often appeal to the unity of the Westphalian nation-state to pull the country out of crisis, 
as for example Ayad Allawi did after the Iraqi elections of 2005: ‘If the objective of 
national unity is missed, if the objective of national reconciliation is overlooked, then 
this will definitely spell out disaster’.51 It is hard to imagine such a leader appealing 
instead to the idea of consciously, even arbitrarily, dividing such a nation into bits, 
especially when the history of federalism in the United States suggests that even under 
such a system, bad social features will survive and tensions persist such that 
intervention from outside – whether from the IMF or some military coalition – might 
prove necessary anyway. 
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